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Abstract—Message digest algorithms are one of the underlying
building blocks of blockchain platforms such as Ethereum.
This paper analyses situations in which the message digest
collision resistance property can be exploited by attackers.
Two mitigations for possible attacks are described: longer
message digest sizes make attacks more difficult; and, including
timeliness properties limits the amount of time an attacker has
to determine a hash collision.
1. Introduction
Message digest algorithms are hard coded into the
Ethereum platform design, being seen as unchanging, un-
breakable building blocks. However, the effective security
provided by message digest algorithms weakens over time
due to improved cryptanalysis, increases in computational
power, and the emergence of quantum computers. Though
attacks may be many years away from being practical, it
is important to understand how they can be mitigated so
that design patterns which facilitate these attacks are not
incorporated into future blockchain designs.
The collision resistance message digest property states
that it is difficult to determine x1 and x2 such that h(x1) =
h(x2) and x1 6= x2. This property is significantly weaker
than the preimage resistance property (given y, it is difficult
to determine x such that y = h(x)) and the second preimage
resistance property (given y and x1, it is difficult to deter-
mine x2 such that y = h(x1) = h(x2) and x1 6= x2). As
such, the collision resistance property should be prioritized
for analysis.
2. Exploitation Scenarios
The scenarios in which the message digest collision
resistance property can be exploited are when:
• The attacker chooses the value to be digested.
• The attacker is able to trick an entity into doing
something based the message digest and value.
• There is no time-sensitive aspect to the value.
Time-sensitivity is important as the first message digest col-
lisions for an algorithm have historically taken a significant
period of time.
3. Attacks
Two example attack scenarios which match the Exploita-
tion Scenarios are now described. Based on the proposal
for EIP86 [1] as at May 2017, when a Transaction Verifi-
cation Contract is deployed the address is calculated using
the equation: Keccak256(rlp.encode([creator + nonce +
initcode]))%2160, where the creator is the account that
created the contract the nonce is a value which should be
sequential, and initcode is the initialization code for the
contract. An attacker who had broken the message digest
collision resistance property could manipulate the nonce
value or the contents of the contract such that there exists
two contracts which would be deployed to the same address.
The attacker could show one variant of the contract to a user
and persuade them to send some Ether to the address. The
attacker could then deploy the nefarious contract and spend
the Ether.
Ethereum’s Proof of Stake proposal [2] needs an agreed
random number to use to choose which miner will create the
next block. One proposal is that a random value be generated
by each miner, the miners submit message digest commit-
ment values prior to exposing their random values to prevent
cheating. The random values are then combined using XOR
to produce the agreed random number. An attacker who had
broken the collision resistance property could determine two
random values which hash to produce the same commitment
value. They could submit their commitment value and then,
after seeing the random values from the other miners, choose
which of their random values to deliver, thus influencing the
resulting agreed random number.
4. Recommended Attack Mitigations
The recommended attack mitigations are:
• The message digest size used for account numbers
should be increased. In an email from V. Buterin
and M. Swende from the Ethereum team on May
18, 2017, they tentatively agreed to adopt this rec-
ommendation of mine.
• A temporal component should be incorporated into
designs. The random value proposed for use in PoS
should incorporate some value from a recent block.
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